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ABSTRACT: This article presents the results of a field research study examining 
commonalities and differences between American and British operational planners’
mental models of planning. We conducted cultural network analysis interviews with 
14 experienced operational planners in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Our results demonstrate the existence of fundamental differences between the ways
American and British expert planners conceive of a high-quality plan. Our results
revealed that the American planners’ model focused on specification of action to
achieve synchronization, providing little autonomy at the level of execution, and
included the belief that increasing contingencies reduces risk. The British planners’
model stressed the internal coherence of the plan to support shared situational 
awareness and thereby flexibility at the level of execution. The British model also
emphasized the belief that reducing the number of assumptions decreases risk.
Overall, the American ideal plan serves a controlling function, whereas the British ideal
plan supports an enabling function. Interestingly, both the U.S. and UK planners
viewed the other’s ideal plan as riskier than their own. The implications of cultural 
models of plans and planning are described for establishing performance measures
and designing systems to support multinational planning teams.
Introduction
ACCORDING TO EXISTING APPROACHES TO MEASURING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES, AMERICANS
and Britons are quite similar. As an example, Hofstede’s (2001) seminal studies
resulted in the documentation of only very subtle differences between the popula-
tions of these two nations along the dimensions of power distance, individual-
ism/collectivism, and so forth. Still, when U.S. and UK planners interact with each
other in operational contexts, they experience the repercussions of substantive
differences. The following quotation is an excerpt from an interview with an
American campaign planner about his experience working with a planner from
the United Kingdom:
We worked with the Brits on doing a plan for security for Pope John
Paul . . . and that was a real different experience—they have a completely
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something anyway; it is far different from what the Americans do. We
kind of kept looking at them like, “are you going to plan this yet?” “Oh
don’t worry about it, it’ll come together.” “Do you plan this stuff?”
Where the American planning process is slightly anal retentive to most
of the world, theirs is a lot more kind of, “Oh it’ll come together, don’t
worry about it.” I don’t know if they did it just to drive the Americans
crazy or what, but it worked. It just kind of drove us nuts.
The following quote, an excerpt from an interview with a British campaign plan-
ner, describes his experience in developing a plan for an American commander:
We did a PowerPoint presentation, a map, and we showed where there
were cut offs here, here, here, and here. And [an American] three-star
general came back and said, “I think two of your cut offs are a little far
from each other.” And we said, “Well we won’t position them like that,
we’ve just shown you dots, you know.” . . . But the three-star general
said, “No, prove to me, I want to see.” We had to go back, put actual
grid references. . . . I’m not criticizing, that’s the way they do it . . . they
have a higher level of detail. Whereas we would say to guys, “Hey, we
want you to do a cut off here,” which means, “Stop enemy coming out,
stop people coming in.” Where do you position yourself?, “Hey, when
you get on the ground, you find the best spot, I can’t tell you from a
map, because I don’t know.”
An implication from these planners’ experiences is that there may be culturally
different ways of thinking about and approaching planning that can potentially
lead to conflicts in multicultural collaborations. Their observations are consistent
with work suggesting that there are significant differences in how coalition part-
ners plan and make decisions (Sieck & Patel, 2007). We propose that some of the
cultural challenges experienced by coalition planning teams are rooted in differ-
ences in cultural knowledge relevant to the domain of planning. Before discussing
such challenges further, we will first clarify the definitions and view of culture and
cultural knowledge adopted here.
A scientific challenge to understanding the effect of cultural diversity on plans
and planning involves generating sound definitions of the construct of culture as
well as methods for analyzing and representing it. Within cognitive anthropology,
culture is typically defined in terms of shared knowledge (Garro, 2000). For
example, as Strauss and Quinn (1997) noted, “Cultural schemas differ not at all
from other schemas learned from humanly mediated experiences, except in being
shared. Schemas unique to individuals are built up from idiosyncratic experience,
while those shared by individuals are built up from the various kinds of common
experience” (p. 122).
More recently, this definition has been refined to account for the fact that
knowledge and ideas tend to be distributed somewhat unevenly among members
Cultural Variations in Concepts of Plan Quality 229of cultural groups. This refined conception of cultural research as investigating
knowledge distributed among populations is gaining acceptance among culture
and cognition theorists, largely under the label of the epidemiological view (Atran,
Medin, & Ross, 2005; Sperber, 1996). The epidemiological view on culture
addresses the widely shared ideas (i.e., the concepts, causal beliefs, and values)
that are distributed among members of a population. Working within this theoret-
ical framework, researchers have developed methods known as cultural network
analysis (CNA), to elicit, analyze, and represent cultural knowledge in the form of
networks of prevalent ideas (Sieck, Rasmussen, & Smart, in press).
CNA represents an interdisciplinary synthesis of methods drawn from the fields
of cognitive anthropology, cultural psychology, naturalistic decision making, and
decision analysis (e.g., Bostrom, Fischhoff, & Morgan, 1992; Garro, 2000; Hoffman,
Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Kleinman, 1978). CNA interviews are designed to
elicit the mental models from members of a particular cultural group situated within
a specific domain. The consensus of individuals’ mental models constitutes a cul-
tural model for that group. CNA methods employed to investigate American and
British cultural models of plans and planning represent aspects such as participants’
beliefs about causal factors that influence plan quality, consequences of low- or high-
quality plans, and procedures and tools intended to support planning. Given this
framework for understanding and modeling cultural knowledge, why should con-
ceptions of plans and planning be expected to vary across cultures?
As the introductory quotes illustrate, people do have different ideas about
what a “good” planning process looks like. The military decision-making process
(MDMP), the U.S. Army’s doctrinal prescription for making decisions and formal-
izing these into orders, represents one perspective on an ideal planning process
(see U.S. Army, 2005). Research in the field of naturalistic decision making pro-
vides evidence that other conceptions of “good” planning processes exist.
For example, Schmitt and Klein (1999) demonstrated that doctrine does not
provide a reliable basis for predicting what a planner’s beliefs and values are with
respect to an ideal planning process. Schmitt and Klein conducted a series of stud-
ies examining the informal and intuitive planning strategies skilled U.S Army and
Marine Corps planning teams use. They concluded that planners rarely follow the
formal, prescribed MDMP. Schmitt and Klein reported that planners, instead of
generating a number of alternative courses of action as prescribed by the MDMP,
often created only one course of action, which was then continually modified and
improved as new information would come in. They termed this approach the
recognitional planning model (RPM) because of its consistency with recognition-
primed decision-making models, in which individuals use their experience to rap-
idly understand situation characteristics and evolve a single decision response
based on that understanding.
Formal empirical evaluations of the prescriptive value of intuitive planning
models, such as the RPM relative to the MDMP, have shown that intuitive models
permit an increase in planning tempo and lead to plans that are more bold and
better adapted to situational demands (Blendell, Molloy, Catchpole, & Henderson,
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In the case of the intuitive operational planning process (IOP), as compared with
the existing Canadian operational planning process, IOP may foster greater collab-
oration and commander involvement in planning (Bryant et al., 2007). In fact,
Thunholm (2006) employed the RPM as a basis for developing a formal planning
model, the planning under time pressure (PUT) model, which is currently employed
as a tactical-level planning model within the Swedish Armed Forces. In contrast,
research on multinational collaboration suggests that U.S. military planning processes
are quite flexible compared with Japanese military planning (McHugh, Smith, &
Sieck, 2008).
There is also a diverse set of perspectives within the military community as to
what a “good” planning outcome, or operational order (OPORD), looks like.
Hoffman and Shattuck (2006) conducted an extensive evaluation of U.S. Army
OPORDs and concluded that these orders are not consistent in how they present
intent—that is, information about intent was not always in the same place and
sometimes was even absent. The different models of the planning process and dif-
ferent values with respect to the content of planning products documented in
these research efforts suggest the existence of different conceptualizations of plans
and planning among professional military planners.
In addition to conceptual variations that have emerged in empirical research
on planning, there are some reasons to expect differences between based on a
comparison of U.S. and UK policies and doctrine. The U.S. Department of
Defense established the Office of Force Transformation (OFT) in 2001 to ensure a
competitive military advantage following the September 11 attacks. The OFT plan
outlines a plan for changing the military force from the bottom up. This plan
focuses on improving the military’s capacity for joint action through the develop-
ment of joint doctrine and technologies for increased information access and
information sharing at all levels. This vision is captured under the rubric network-
centric operations.
The network-centric or information-centric approach in the United States has
led to increased reliance on information technologies. It is possible that this trend
has resulted in a command system that tends to suppress decentralized decision
making. In the United States, those at the major command levels have easier and
faster access to information, which may lead them to feel more confident about
their decision making and thus more reluctant to disperse decision making down
the command hierarchy.
The United Kingdom, in turn, has generated policies that explicitly place great
emphasis on the notion of agility as part of its future defense vision (Ministry of
Defence, 2003). Rather than being a network-centric approach, the UK policy
focuses on human-centric attributes by regarding agility as an attribute of an indi-
vidual’s thinking, as demonstrated in the UK Joint High Level Operational Concept
(Ministry of Defence, 2005): “essentially a human-centric attribute epitomised by
the enduring ability of our people to think creatively, to be resourceful and imagi-
native and to adapt with versatility to the unexpected” (p. 6.2).
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tralized command structures. The idea is that commanders should be able to specify
strategic and operational goals without specifying how such objectives are to be
accomplished. In the same publication, the UK Ministry of Defence outlined its
vision for such increased decentralization of decision making: “This type of com-
mand process will be characterized by light corrections on the ‘command tiller’ to
establish synchronization of subordinate action with higher level intent, followed
by immediate restoration of freedom of action to the lowest possible levels”
(Ministry of Defence, 2005, p. 2.4).
These policy descriptions suggest that British planners’ shared conception of a
good plan may reflect a generally more positive attitude toward decentralization,
as compared with that of U.S. planners. However, the situation is not entirely
clear. As mentioned in the Schmitt and Klein (1999) work described previously,
experts’ mental models do not always conform to doctrine and policy. Empirical
research with experienced military planners is needed to determine whether there
are real differences between U.S. and UK cultural models of plans and planning as
well as to specify the nature of variations found.
The aim of the current research was to determine whether there are systematic
cultural variations between U.S. and UK cultural models of planning. A cultural
model of planning comprises a group’s consensus on plan-relevant concepts as
well as their beliefs about the causal relationships between concepts—that is, the
antecedents and consequences of planning activities and their outcomes.
Method
Participants
The study participants were 14 experienced U.S. and UK campaign planners,
6 at Fort Leavenworth General Staff College in the United States and 8 at Cranfield
Defence College in the United Kingdom. All the U.S. planners were lieutenant
colonels, and the UK planners held the equivalent rank in their respective armed
forces branch. All 6 American planners were in the U.S. Army; 4 of the UK plan-
ners were in the British Army, 3 were in the Royal Air Force, and 1 was from the
Royal Marines. All planners had between 18 and 33 years of experience in the mil-
itary (U.S. average  19 years, UK average  25 years). Four of the planners were
stationed abroad at the time they were interviewed and, we felt, were more likely
to provide responses that were colored by their recent experiences operating
within a foreign planning environment. We also selected 10 interviews (5 American
and 5 British) for analysis in which the planners had been interviewed in their
country of origin.
Procedure
Each planner was interviewed individually using the same CNA interview
guide. For each question, interviewees were asked to think back to one or more
particularly memorable planning experiences that they had encountered in the
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riences and thereby ensure the validity of their responses (Crandall, Klein, &
Hoffman, 2006).
A primary and a second interviewer were present for all interviews. The pri-
mary interviewer was responsible for covering the questions in the interview
guide. The second interviewer was responsible for taking notes and asking ques-
tions of clarification. Two pairs of interviewers carried out the interviews. The inter-
views lasted between 1 and 2 hr depending upon the availability of the participating
planners. We recorded each interview using a digital voice recorder.
Materials
A CNA interview guide was developed to elicit individual planners’ mental
models of plan quality. The CNA interview probes the interviewee’s understanding
of the antecedents of particular states, events, or actions of interest as well as the
outcomes or effects these can have within particular situations or experiences. The
questions probed the concepts, causal beliefs, and values relevant to the following
aspects of planning: plan quality, causal factors that determine plan quality, conse-
quences of high- and low-quality plans, functions of plans and planning, open-
ness to making revisions in the plan (i.e., replanning), and supporting processes
and tools that lead to high-quality plans. Example questions from the guide include
the following:
• Can you tell us about a time when your team had developed an especially
good plan?
• What are some of the characteristics that differentiate a good plan from a
poor plan?
• What’s the biggest mistake that a new person makes in thinking about what
a plan is?
• We have talked to some good planners who say that the plan is just a
platform for improvisation, rather than to be executed as written. What has
your experience told you about this statement? Examples?
Data Preparation/Analysis
We used a four-step process to code and analyze the interview data. First, we
transcribed the interviews and performed a protocol analysis extraction of all ref-
erences in the interviews to either the causal attributes of the planning process,
the planning team, or the plan itself (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). This is an example
of a reference from a UK interview: “I think if you plan too much and if you have
too many contingencies, everything is fine-tuned down to the last minute, when it
goes wrong, as it will, it throws you because you’re so tied in to this rigid structure
and you’re expecting to pick up the next COMM plan [communications plan] or
when it doesn’t happen it throws you out even more.”
Second, we translated these references into one or more propositions relating the
causal relationships referred to in more simple terms. For example, the propositions
resulting from the foregoing reference were “including too many contingencies leads
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ity to react to unexpected circumstances.” This translation process generated a
total of 210 propositions relating to the causal relationships among planning com-
ponents as well as definitions of planning concepts across the 10 interviews.
Next, we sorted the propositions according to which aspect of planning they
addressed (plan quality, causal factors that determine plan quality, etc.). The sort-
ing aided us in the process of creating concept maps by providing high-level
structure and organization for the maps.
Fourth, and finally, we used the propositions to create two concept maps, one
for the U.S. and one for the UK participants. The knowledge (i.e., concepts,
beliefs, values, and connections among these) elicited during a CNA interview is
effectively captured and visualized in a semantic network. In a semantic network,
each node represents a concept and links are used to define relations between the
concepts. We created concept map representations of the mental models of plan-
ning using the CmapTools software (Cañas et al., 2004; Crandall, Klein & Hoffman,
2006; Novak, 1998). These two concept maps served as a representation of the
union of ideas within each national group.
Results
Overall, our results indicate that the U.S. and UK participants agreed on a very
fundamental notion of what planning is about. They both expressed the view that
planning is about identifying an end, or a goal, figuring out ways to get to that end,
and the means by which you are going to get there. However, we observed interest-
ing differences between the ways the U.S. and UK participants appeared to think
about the role of the commander, the relationship between the kind of detail and
plan quality, autonomy in planning and execution, risk, and what the ultimate
function of a plan is. Each of these will be discussed in more detail in the following.
Concept of Commander Involvement
A prominent difference between U.S. and UK planning processes concerns the
role of the commander. The United States predominantly uses a staff-led planning
process, whereas the United Kingdom employs a command-led process. In the
United States, it is usually the case that the commander meets with the planning
staff only during a few formally scheduled briefing sessions—one at the begin-
ning, when the commander briefs the staff on his or her intent, and one toward
the end, when the staff brief the commander on the planning solutions they have
generated. In this episodic involvement, the sessions become the main opportuni-
ties for the staff to obtain the commander’s guidance and his or her ultimate “buy-
in” (see Figure 1).
This means that presentation and explanation become a vital part of the vali-
dation process: In order to get the commander’s buy-in, you have to make sure
that you present it well so that he or she can understand it. As one U.S. planner
explained, “presenting it was a huge part of any plan we ever made. Because
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.although [the commander’s] a really smart guy, if he started struggling through
this stuff and had to ask a lot of questions about what our thinking was, we were
probably failing in explaining it properly.”
In contrast, in the United Kingdom the commander plays a key role in initiat-
ing the planning process, as in the United States, but beyond that he or she is
continually involved in the planning process and is far more accessible for consul-
tation. The UK planners we talked to noted that the involvement of the com-
mander in the planning process itself is seen as a mechanism for ensuring the
commander’s buy-in and satisfaction with the final outcome (see Figure 1). Because
the commander is an instrumental part of creating the plan, he or she is ultimately
more likely to agree with the plan.
These distinct models of commander involvement have implications for how
command intent is communicated and transmitted and, ultimately, how it shapes
the planning process. The episodic involvement in the United States entails that
the staff have fewer, snapshot-like windows into the commander’s intentions. This
puts greater pressure on the formal documents that capture and communicate the
commander’s intent. In the United Kingdom, the staff have more continuous
access to the commander, which means that they have opportunities to clarify and
perhaps even negotiate the commander’s intent with the commander.
The nature of the involvement of the commander in the planning process has
important implications for the ways in which the planners conceptualize other
important aspects of planning, such as level of detail, autonomy, risk, and plan
function. Each of these aspects is discussed further in the following.
Concept of Plan Detail
Our results indicate that the U.S. and UK planners agree on the general notion
that there is a relationship between the amount of detail in the plan and the over-
all plan quality. Both U.S. and UK planners indicated that the plan should be some-
what detailed in order to be a high-quality plan. Interestingly, however, planners
from these two nations seem to have different ideas about which dimension of the
plan should have a relatively high level of detail, as illustrated in Figure 2.
United States: Specifying Ways/Means to Enable Synchronization. The American
model of planning specifies that a high-quality plan provides direction in terms of
both goals and methods (see Figure 2). However, most of the ideas the American
planners expressed had to do with providing direction on methods. They noted
that a high-quality plan should specify what needs to be done as well as how it
should be done—and specifying the “how” or the “ways” is particularly impor-
tant. The U.S. planners expressed this idea by emphasizing the importance of
working out the “how” through specifying the actions and by generating contin-
gent methods to support meeting an objective. The implication was that if this
was not done, the resulting plan would be of inferior quality.
One planner described the consequences of not providing “enough” detail:
“So all of a sudden you come out of division rehearsal with a completely new plan,
because you went into it with a very general plan, as opposed to a detailed plan.
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.And then, all of a sudden, you know you come out of the division rehearsal and
instead of being well synchronized, you come out having to write a whole new
plan because subordinate commanders have all changed their minds because you
didn’t tell them what to do. And I’ve seen that happen. And as a result of a poor
initial plan it was left to the subordinate commanders to kind of fill in the blanks.”
From this American planner’s perspective, failing to provide enough detail
makes it less likely that the subordinate commanders will buy into the plan. The
U.S. planners emphasized that a plan with detailed specification of actions and
resources provides direction for the individuals who are inheriting the plan. Better
direction, in turn, means that the plan will be easier to execute because it reduces
the number of decisions that have to be made down the line. The U.S. planners
therefore appeared to express the idea that a plan is a representation of decisions
that have been made ahead of execution time—that is, it provides a roadmap for
execution.
In fact, the U.S. planners were so emphatic about the notion that the plan
should provide a roadmap that they even expressed disdain for failing to specify
actions appropriately. One U.S. planner indicated that a plan lacking action speci-
fication would indicate laziness on the part of the planner. Specifically, he said,
“We’re going to do it in enough detail that subordinate units can execute it . . . to
say that the plan is just a starting point, I couldn’t disagree with you more. I think
that is a cop-out for a staff that doesn’t do detailed planning.”
In contrast to specifying action, the UK planners focused instead on the ability
of the plan to enable action.
United Kingdom: Specifying Logic to Enable Adaptation. British planners consis-
tently emphasized that the links among the ends, the ways, and the means are more
important than providing a lot of detail on the ways and means (see Figure 2).
Specifying these logical linkages, or the rationale, is also more important than gener-
ating a great many contingencies (i.e., providing alternative ways and means).
One British planner described a specific planning experience that provided a
particularly detailed account of the importance of preserving the logic within a
plan and what it means to do so: “I was able to comprehensively, convincingly
demonstrate the etymology of the plan, the genesis of the plan linking it from the
policy, which I had been given, and I had no input to the policy itself, how we
broke that down into a set of conditions and a strategy. How that could be devel-
oped and implemented in terms of money and time, programming. And then how
that could be realized in a plan. And once I’d got that into the minds of the com-
mand group, then they were comfortable in terms of there were no holes in that
deductive, rational, analytical thought process.”
The UK planners indicated that the logic of the plan, when made explicit, can
serve to communicate the plan’s intent (i.e., the commander’s intent). They further
indicated that if the plan fails to demonstrate the logic, then whoever inherits the
plan will be less likely to pick up the intent. If a subordinate fails to inherit the
intent, he or she will be less likely to be able to adapt and execute flexibly, in a
238 Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making / Fall2009manner that is in line with the intent. The UK planners emphasized that having
the ability to execute flexibly and still satisfy the commander’s high-level objec-
tives is paramount to success in a dynamic operating environment.
Our conclusion is that instead of seeing the plan as a record of decisions made
by the planning team, the UK planners see the plan as a representation of the
planning team’s decision making. That is, the plan should contain the reasons
behind, or the rationale for, selecting a particular strategy or course of action in
order to achieve the commander’s intent. The UK planners, in fact, were adamant
about explicitly representing the logic or rationale for decisions made in the plan.
They talked about a good plan as one that was “transparent”—that is, that anyone
who picks up the plan can recognize the high-level intent. As one planner put it,
“The articulation of the commander’s ideas and his intent, as long as that thread is
throughout the whole plan, that makes it transparent.”
The UK planners further emphasized that a plan with a clear logic, or clear
statements of rationale, allows the individuals who are inheriting the plan to
understand the link between the commander’s intent (the high-level guidance) and
the ways or methods outlined in the plan. The UK planners emphasized that a plan
that provides a solid platform will lead to more successful execution because it
enables the individuals who are executing it to make their own decisions.
Overall, the U.S. planners indicated that a plan should specify action at some
adequate level of detail. The UK planners, on the other hand, emphasized that a
good plan should have sound and coherent logic. The U.S. planners, in turn, did
not mention logic or rationale as an important, understandable attribute of the
plan. The UK planners tended to see detailed specification of action as a constraint
on flexible execution. They saw detailing of the logical relationships as a way to
facilitate decision making on the part of those who are executing the plan. When
the UK planners talked about specification of action, it was in the context of how
detrimental overspecification could be for the flexibility of their colleagues who
would be inheriting the plan.
The different ways of satisfying the commander implied by the command- and
staff-led processes have differential implications for the level of detail (i.e., the
number of contingencies that are included in the plan). If the planners have less
insight into the commander’s intent, as is the case in the United States, then they
may need to add more contingencies in the hope of generating a solution that
matches the commander’s vision.
Concept of Plan Function
Both the U.S. and UK planners emphasized mission analysis as an important
phase in the planning process. The purpose of mission analysis is to obtain an in-
depth understanding of the current situation, the enemy, and so forth. In that
sense, for both the U.S. and the UK planners, certain aspects of the planning
process are about increasing awareness of the problem that is being addressed.
However, the planners did not appear to converge on the function the final plan
serves for the individuals who are executing it, as illustrated in Figure 3.
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.United Kingdom: Plan as Foundation for Awareness. The UK participants empha-
sized plans as providing shared situational awareness (see Figure 3). This is con-
sistent with the general focus among the UK planners on enabling the individuals
who are executing the plan to be able to execute it flexibly. The goal here is for the
plan to provide a solid understanding of what the problem is and what the envi-
sioned end state or goal is. Once the executors have a common understanding of
what the goal is, they would be able to react to changes in the environment, adapt
the plan, and still execute a coordinated effort.
United States: Plan as Foundation for Synchronization. The U.S. planners appeared
to focus on the plan as a way to ensure synchronization of actions (see Figure 3),
as illustrated by the following interview excerpt: “But to just say, ‘Hey, we’ll just
write a very generic plan, giving some overall guidance, and have junior com-
manders figure it out.’ No, because when you start to do that and then all of a sud-
den those enablers aren’t synchronized, and you have units that are executing out
of synchronization from each other. You have units that are putting out different
messages; for example, you’re putting out a PSYOP [psychological operations]
product in this area of town, and this area of town you’re putting out the complete
opposite. So, I think that is a cop-out for a staff that’s not doing their job.”
Overall, the UK planners seemed to have the view that plans serve an enabling
function, whereas the U.S. planners view plans as serving a controlling function.
The goal in both cases is unity of effort. However, the two different conceptions of
how to go about attaining this have very different implications for both the plan-
ning process and the final planning product.
Concept of Autonomy
Mission command in the United States as well as the United Kingdom advo-
cates the view that staff at all levels need to have flexibility to exploit opportunities
and respond to threats. The planners we interviewed all appeared to support a
certain amount of autonomy. However, the UK planners in general expressed the
view that autonomy is necessary at all levels of the command hierarchy. The U.S.
planners talked more about autonomy at the level of planning and presented argu-
ments against autonomy at the level of execution. The U.S. and UK cultural mod-
els of autonomy are presented in Figure 4.
United Kingdom: Freedom in Execution. As outlined in the previous section, the UK
planners regarded the fundamental function of a plan as providing a foundation for
flexibility in execution. It seems that UK planners place a great deal of value on free-
dom in execution (see Figure 4). It is possible that the UK planners simply do not
need to talk about freedom in interpretation of intent, as stressed in the United States,
because their commanders are more involved in the planning process.
United States: Freedom in Interpretation of Intent. The U.S. planners spoke instead
of freedom in terms of interpreting the commander’s intent (see Figure 4). In fact,
the U.S. planners appeared to construe “freedom in execution” rather negatively.
Cultural Variations in Concepts of Plan Quality 241They spoke of the absence of constraints in terms of requirements to make deci-
sions, rather than as an opportunity to adapt to circumstances.
Concept of Risk
Both the UK and U.S. planners appeared to see a relationship between the
number of contingencies that are included in a plan and how risky the plan is,
related to the fact that each contingency brings in its own assumptions. However,
the UK planners seemed to think that having more contingencies increases risk,
whereas the U.S. planners thought that having more contingencies decreases risk.
The models for risk are illustrated in Figure 5.
United Kingdom: Contingencies Increase Risk. The UK participants emphasized
that making too many assumptions increases risk. This is related to the amount
and kind of detail to include in plans. Generally, adding more detail about actions
was seen as increasing the number of assumptions in the plan, which leads to
increased risk (see Figure 5). One UK planner in particular talked in detail about
the risks involved in making assumptions and adding contingencies to the plan.
The quote appeared previously, in the Data Preparation/Analysis section, but bears
repeating in the present context: “I think if you plan too much and if you have too
many contingencies, everything is fine-tuned down to the last minute, when it
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Figure 4. Concept maps illustrating the UK (left panel) and U.S. (right panel) concep-
tions of autonomy in planning.Cultural Variations in Concepts of Plan Quality 243
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.goes wrong, as it will, it throws you because you’re so tied in to this rigid structure
and you’re expecting to pick up the next COMM plan [communications plan] or
when it doesn’t happen it throws you out even more.”
United States: Contingencies Decrease Risk. The U.S. planners talked about risk
minimization in terms of preventing surprises (see Figure 5). We heard from the
UK planners that they perceive the U.S. planners as relying more on intelligence.
Indeed, the U.S. planners did talk about the relationship among seeking intelli-
gence about enemy actions, matching the plan to enemy actions, and how “risky”
the plan is. The implication is that the more intelligence the planners consider, the
more likely they are to add contingencies so as to reduce risk.
According to the UK model of planning, adding contingencies means making
more assumptions and, therefore, increasing risk. The U.S. model, in contrast,
implies that a less detailed plan is riskier. For example, one American planner said
explicitly, “Risk aversion leads to a very detailed plan.” The implication of this
finding is that U.S. and UK planners would agree on risk reduction as a funda-
mental value for plans. However, differences in their causal beliefs pertaining to
the antecedents of plan risk would lead each of them to judge the other’s plans as
unduly risky.
Indicators of Plan Quality
There is no clear universal consensus on what constitutes a high-quality plan.
The U.S. and UK planners agreed that you really cannot know whether or not you
have a good plan until after it has “made contact.” That is, you have to implement
a plan in order to know whether it is a good one. Planners from the United States
and the United Kingdom, however, did not have the same ideas about what indi-
cators to look for, during planning and as the plan is being implemented, in order
to determine whether or not the plan is good. The U.S. planners tended to talk
about synchronization as an indication that a plan had been implemented success-
fully. That is, were the specified actions carried out at the right time and in the right
order? The UK planners, however, seemed to focus on adaptation instead of syn-
chronization. In this case, did the plan enable making the right decisions at the
right time and appropriately adjusting actions to evolving circumstances?
The results provided here are summarized at the level of the cultural group.
There were individual planners who expressed ideas that were inconsistent with
the cultural models outlined for their nation in this paper. To obtain an indicator
of the level of inconsistency within each model, we divided the ideas into the five
categories and performed a one-by-one comparison of each statement with every
other statement within each category. From this we determined the relative num-
ber of contradictions for each model. In the U.S. data, 6.3% of the ideas had an
expressed opposite. In the UK data, 3.7% of the ideas had an expressed opposite.
This means that the preponderance of ideas expressed by U.S. planners was con-
sistent with the cultural model outlined for the United States, and the same was
true for the UK planners.
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The present study revealed several cultural differences between American and
British conceptions of plans and planning. In summary, UK planners tended to
emphasize the plan’s logic (internal consistency and coherence), whereas U.S.
planners regarded the plan as a vehicle for providing direction on methods (how
an objective should be achieved). The goal of planning for UK planners appeared
to be flexibility at the level of execution, and they regarded the plan as a vehicle
for achieving flexibility by supporting shared situational awareness. For U.S. plan-
ners, the goal of planning appeared to be synchronization, and they regarded the
plan as a platform for achieving this.
The participants’ thoughts on autonomy in planning were consistent with
their culturally distinct models of plan function. The UK planners regarded auton-
omy as important at all levels of the command hierarchy. The U.S. planners, in
turn, emphasized the importance of autonomy at the planning stage. Similarly, the
U.S. and UK planners’ cultural models of risk were consistent with their models of
plan function and autonomy. The UK planners emphasized that making too many
assumptions in planning increases risk. In turn, the U.S. planners believe they
reduce risk by including contingencies to prevent surprises.
In this discussion, we describe some of the historical influences that provide at
least a partial account of those differences. Then, we examine the effects of the cul-
tural differences on attitudes and preferences for tools in current use. Finally, we
discuss the implications of the research for the design and development of future
tools to support coalition planning.
Historical Influences
Although a complete understanding of the origins of variations in cultural
knowledge is a complex sociohistorical research endeavor in its own right, we
describe some differences between U.S. and UK military histories that may have
led to some of the contemporary variations in mindset reported here.
British military history reveals a long-standing tradition for emphasizing adap-
tation. In an annex to a British Army Doctrine publication, Senior Lecturer in War
Studies Dr. Brian Holden Reid (1995) noted, “if there is one word that sums up
the British command style, it is improvisation” (p. 45). Reid went on, “a universal
expectation prevails, almost operating like a law of nature, that a Wellington or a
Montgomery, will turn up and . . . turn defeat into victory” (p. 45). British com-
manders are therefore expected to be skilled improvisers. The basic assumption is
that things will fall apart, and the commander is expected to be able to patch them
up again.
This ability to “patch things up” within the British system of thought is enabled
through a strong commitment to mission command. Mission command was prac-
ticed spectacularly, and even sometimes attributed to, Admiral Lord Nelson, one
of the most significant British military icons of all time. Mission command is a
leadership style in which command and control is exercised through consultation
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commanders, if provided a thorough understanding of their superior comman-
der’s intent, are able to instinctively adapt to inevitable changes in the operating
environment and still act in accordance with their commander’s intent. As one of
the British interviewees put it, “It goes back to Nelson. It’s that Nelsonian touch;
. . . his commanders knew, instinctively, ‘Okay, if this breaks down or that’s hap-
pening, or we lose this, actually, it’s very clear what I would need to do under
those circumstances.’”
Interestingly, this embedded flexibility in the British system of command and
control invites the interpretation that the British are ill-prepared. In fact, to quote
another historical icon, Admiral Lord Chatfield, who was minister for Co-Ordination
of Defence in the 1930s, “it was traditional British policy never to be ready and to
be rather proud of it” (Reid, 1995, p. 44).
Col. Christopher Paparone (2001) provided an in-depth analysis of the devel-
opment of what is called the military decision-making process (MDMP) in the
United States. He pointed to the industrial age’s focus on technology and German
strategic ingenuity as having an important influence even on contemporary
American military thinking: “During the industrial age, military theory began
viewing armies as machines of the nation-state. Detailed algorithms of mobiliza-
tion, rail schedules, and troop movements became the business of army staffs as
keys to decisive victories. . . . [The] Germans proved that an army that could plan
detailed requirements, orchestrate capabilities rapidly and implement them pre-
cisely would win large-scale wars of national mobilization” (p. 45).
Col. Paparone (2001) argued that the current U.S. Army culture places consid-
erable value on the analytical (procedural) aspects of the MDMP, exemplifying a
third-generation warfare mentality. (Third-generation warfare employs high-speed
armor and movement on the battlefield with the objective of physically destroying
the enemy. Fourth-generation warfare, in contrast, has a goal of collapsing the
enemy internally rather than physically destroying it, which means that targets
include things such as the population’s support for the war and the enemy’s culture.)
Historically, the ambition toward comprehensive analysis has been a consistent
pursuit within military planning and decision making as well in the development of
wartime policies. Vietnam War–era Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was
one of the most illustrious front men in the quest for comprehensiveness. McNamara
pioneered the institution of computerized, statistical methodology for conducting
systems analysis, enabling the consideration of a much greater set of contextual fac-
tors than had previously been possible (Grattan, 2006). It was the aim that every
decision could be considered in as broad a context as necessary. Notably, McNamara’s
computerized methodology forecasted that the Vietnam War would end within a
reasonable period of time. The fervor with which computational models that can
assist in the prediction of effects across the spectrum of operations are pursued, and
the fervor with which technological solutions to complex problems are pursued in
general, remain prominent within the United States.
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tinct U.S. and UK cultural models of plans and planning, and we recognize that
future research is needed to fully explicate the myriad causal factors involved.
Next, we examine the effects of the distinct models on preferences for plan repre-
sentation formats and tools.
Implications of Cultural Differences for Tool Usage
One potential implication of the differences between the U.S. and UK concep-
tualizations of planning is a difference in the general attitudes toward tools and
their role in the planning process, as well as tendencies to use different tools to
develop and represent plans. For example, Americans use Microsoft PowerPoint to
capture and brief plans, whereas Britons tend to use Microsoft Word documents.
This makes for an important difference between the two nations’ work processes.
In the interviews, the U.S. planners expressed strong opposition to using Word,
whereas the UK planners expressed the opposite sentiment. We suggest that a
potential reason the UK planners show strong preferences for using Word is that
this format is better for capturing the relationships between stages of thinking
in the planning process. To support this notion, they refer to U.S. thinking as
“PowerPoint deep,” meaning that the method that Americans use to physically
represent and brief their plans constrains them to a “shallow” way of thinking
about the plan.
One UK planner described a specific experience he had while working with
Americans when he was obliged to brief the American commander using
PowerPoint. He indicated a preference for capturing the logic, or rationale, using
Word: “I could give them the PowerPoint deep bit, which was woven together, but
if they wanted to do root canal surgery I always had the team in the wings who
could come out with the detail that underpinned my PowerPoint brief. But what
we never had the time to do in that 3 weeks was turn that PowerPoint into a Word
document, a seamless policy, strategy, program, plan.”
It is possible that because Word allows you to write in coherent expository
form, you can capture the relationships between the intent and the strategy, for
example, in a way that the bullet-point format in PowerPoint does not. Basic cog-
nitive research has shown that exposition does, in fact, affect reasoning and deci-
sion processes, consistent with this claim (Sieck & Yates, 1997).
Implications of Cultural Differences for Technology Design
The current study has a number of implications for the development of future
technologies to support coalition planning. First and foremost, the results affirm
the supposition that technology development initiatives should be sensitive to the
concepts, causal beliefs, and values of different cultural groups. In terms of tech-
nology design, we propose that designers will be able to assess commonalities and
differences between two or more cultures based on CNA’s formal representations
of culturally shared knowledge. Comparing the cultural models can enable the
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support diverse cultural models of the planning task.
Our results indicate that U.S. and UK planners are essentially solving different
problems: For example, the Americans are developing detailed blueprints for
action, whereas the Britons are creating plan representations that can support the
effective communication of command intent. Our results also indicated that although
the U.S. and UK planners agreed that one really cannot know whether or not one
has a high-quality plan until after it has “made contact,” prior to execution they do
look at very different aspects of the plan when they evaluate quality. As we out-
lined, U.S. planners pay attention to the level of detail that the plan provides on
the methods that should be used for enacting the plan. UK planners, in turn,
focus on whether or not the plan explicitly outlines the logic between methods
and goals. Based on this, the functionality of coalition-planning tools should be
differentially suited to cultural groups and their particular way of parsing the
problem space. This means that differences in cultural models could translate into
design considerations with respect to
• the opportunities for user interaction afforded by the tool;
• the kind of information made available to users at different stages of the
planning process;
• the support for creating, defining, and editing different types of information;
and
• the ease with which users can assess whether or not a given plan meets
certain cultural criteria for quality.
We suggest that in order for a planning tool to support both cultural models
of the relationship between the planning process and plan outcomes, it should
accommodate a planning process in which much attention is given to detail on
methods and a process whereby the logic between methods and goals is elabo-
rated in detail. Further, the tool should make it easy to assess whether or not a
given plan meets these two cultural criteria for quality. We propose that when the
system supports these diverse cultural models of the task, it will allow both U.S.
and UK users to share knowledge and coordinate their cognitive work. This could
perhaps be achieved through improvements to the operational orders (OPORD)
component of the planning process.
The OPORD is essentially the document through which echelons communicate
intent up and down the command hierarchy. Empirical work by Hoffman and
Shattuck (2006) has suggested that the OPORD process could be enhanced by
allowing the expression of OPORD information in meaningful diagrams, such as
concept maps. Diagrams support cognition in a number of important ways—among
others, by shifting some of the information-processing burden onto the visual per-
ception system. Diagrams such as concept maps are flexible with respect to the level
of detail that can be included, and they make it easier to see the logical linkages
between planning elements, including the commander’s intent, and thus appear to
satisfy requirements from both planning communities sampled in the current study.
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multinational planning team performance is through intelligent assistive functions
that support the development of plans that are acceptable along multiple evalua-
tive dimensions. In order to support machine-based, culture-sensitive evaluations
of plan quality, a common representational scheme is needed for capturing the
contents of the cultural models themselves—for example, to be able to define and
represent what it means for something for to be a good or acceptable plan from a
specific cultural viewpoint.
One way of explicitly representing the content of cultural models is to capital-
ize on the technological outcomes of the semantic Web initiative (Berners-Lee,
Hendler, & Lassila, 2001). Ontology languages such as the Ontology Web Language
(OWL) could be useful here because they provide a means to create conditions for
category membership based on the properties of plans and their component parts
(Antoniou & van Harmelen, 2004; McGuiness & van Harmelen, 2004). One
direction for future research is to explore the potential of OWL to represent cul-
tural knowledge, perhaps through the use of the CmapTools extension called
CmapTools Ontology Editor (COE), which translates resource description frame-
work (RDF) and OWL to and from concept maps (Eskridge, Hayes, Hoffman, &
Warren, 2006).
Conclusion
The changing nature of contemporary military engagements has led those in
Western militaries to rethink important aspects of how they conduct operations.
Some have argued that the problems inherent in modern conflicts, such as coun-
tering insurgencies or combating terrorism, require a new conception of coalition
planning. One line of research suggests that solving the kinds of complex,
“wicked” challenges that face the global community today requires a diversity of
perspectives and expertise, which can be applied only through effective collabora-
tion between culturally dissimilar coalition partners and local delegates (Pierce &
Dixon, 2006). Including all of the relevant parties “at the table” appears to be
insufficient, given that even very culturally similar partners such as the United
States and the United Kingdom have different views of how to proceed in making
decisions and plans. In addition, planning processes and systems must be devel-
oped that can be flexibly adapted to operate well with the culturally distinct decision-
making customs of all of the coalition partners involved.
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